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Implementing Electricity Restructuring: 
Policies, Potholes, and Prospects 
Timothy J. Brennan, Karen Palmer, and Salvador Martinez* 
I. Introduction 
As the 21st century begins, the United States, like many other industrialized nations, is in 
the midst of a revolution in the electricity business. An industry dominated by monopoly utility 
companies, regulated from top to bottom by the states and the federal government, is seeing 
competition and deregulation in the generation and sale of electric power. These changes both 
facilitate and are facilitated by the wider role that new, independent generators play in this 
sector. In addition, promoting competition has become associated with rules, regulations, 
institutions, and in some cases divestitures designed to ensure that the power markets operate 
efficiently and competitively. For that reason, the process of enacting and implementing laws 
and policies to bring more competition to electric power markets has come to be known as 
restructuring. 
The promise of electricity restructuring is that a competitive market in power, 
accompanied by effective regulation of distribution and transmission and appropriate policies to 
ensure reliability, will lead to a more efficient electricity industry. Generators will have 
incentives to use the least-cost technologies for producing power, and competition will allow 
those savings to be passed on to consumers. But ensuring that markets achieve their goals 
requires attention to make sure that competition works well where it can, and that price 
regulation promotes efficiency where monopoly is inevitable. In addition, policy can help 
improve the market’s performance by ensuring that the prices people pay reflect those social 
                                                 
* The authors are, respectively, Professor, Policy Sciences and Economics, University of Maryland Baltimore 
County and Senior Fellow, Resources for the Future; Senior Fellow, Resources for the Future; and graduate student, 
Department of Economics, University of Florida. This paper is adapted from the book Alternating Currents: 
Electricity Markets and Public Policy, to be published by Resources for the Future in 2002. The book expands on 
many of the issues that we only sketch here. The authors wish to thank Ranjit Bharvirkar and Meghan McGuinness 
for valuable research assistance. We also thank Andrew Kleit, Adam Rose, Tim Considine, and seminar participants 
at the Department of Energy, Environmental and Mineral Economics at Penn State. All remaining errors are the 
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costs (e.g., pollution-related harms) and public benefits (e.g., basic scientific research) that may 
fall by the wayside. 
Although the term restructuring may be unique to electricity, the sometimes painful 
process of undergoing a transformation from regulation to competition is not. Electricity is one 
of the last of a succession of industries in which market forces have been introduced to take over 
the duties of choosing product characteristics, determining supplies, and setting prices. Our 
economy has coped with, and in large degree profited from, similar upheavals in banking, 
transportation, and telecommunications. Opening markets to competition generally gives firms 
better incentives to control costs, introduce innovations, and seek new ways to serve consumers. 
Competition among firms means that the benefits of those efforts get passed down to consumers 
in terms of better services at lower prices. The hope underlying restructuring is that the $220 
billion electricity sector will see benefits comparable to those achieved from opening other 
industries to the market. We begin by identifying some of the specific benefits that might be 
expected to follow the introduction of retail competition to electricity markets. 
Much of what we learned from the upheavals in banking, transportation, and 
telecommunications is useful in designing policies for restructuring the electricity industry. But 
electricity has a unique combination of attributes that present unusual and thorny problems for 
those charged with expanding competition among power producers. To understand those 
problems, we offer below some background on the electricity industry. We review the 
technology for producing and delivering power, the structure of the sector, the history of policy 
and regulation directed toward it, and recent experience with restructuring both in the United 
States and internationally. We then briefly outline the major questions facing policymakers as 
they deal with deciding whether, when, and how to implement restructuring. These matters 
include industry structure, future regulation, maintaining system integrity and reliability, 
promoting competition, and protecting the environment.  
We continue with some thoughts on current economic and political controversies 
associated with electricity restructuring. The most prominent is the California electricity crisis of 
2000 and 2001. We briefly summarize the events in California following the electricity price 
spikes in June 2000 and the response of policymakers. Although this situation is still unfolding, 
we describe several factors that may have contributed to the crisis and present some lessons 
learned. We also present some thoughts on other political controversies associated with 
electricity restructuring. Resources for the Future  Brennan, Palmer, and Martinez 
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However daunting those problems seem, they are similar to problems that society has 
already addressed in other contexts. More challenging are the factors that make electricity 
different. In our view, the primary differences arise from the combination of three 
characteristics: electricity is crucial to the economy; it is technically exacting, in that supply must 
equal demand at all times; and it is interrelated, in that one firm’s inability to serve its customers 
can bring down the entire network. Putting these characteristics together suggests that the make-
or-break issue in electricity restructuring is whether the effective cooperation necessary to 
maintain reliability in an interrelated and technically exacting industry is compatible with the 
sufficient competition necessary to bring about greater efficiency and lower prices. The 
importance of electricity to the economy means that this make-or-break issue deserves the 
attention of the public and those elected and appointed to serve it. 
II. Benefits of Retail Choice 
The push for opening retail electricity markets to competition is premised on the idea that 
competition offers several advantages over traditional regulation. One advantage is the benefit 
that competition brings to any market: competitive pressure among power suppliers should lead 
to a lower price overall for electricity.1 The pressure would start with competition among 
incumbents; new firms able to construct generators with more advanced technologies would only 
increase the downward pressure on prices. Savings from competition were in fact forecast; for 
example, the U.S. Department of Energy estimated savings of about $20 billion, or about 10% of 
the nation’s electricity bill.2 The expectation of such savings affected the willingness of states to 
open their markets: states with higher electricity rates (e.g., California and New York) tended to 
open electricity markets earlier than others.3  
A second advantage of opening electricity markets is that competition may reduce 
distortions in pricing and allocation created by the regulatory system. An example is the 
apparently favorable treatment given to industrial buyers over residential buyers. Through the 
late 1990s, industrial customers purchased electricity at a substantial discount relative to 
                                                 
1 It is important to keep in mind that the price savings would be only on the energy and marketing components of 
the electricity sector. Electricity transmission and distribution will remain regulated for the foreseeable future. 
2 The U.S. Department of Energy estimates savings of “at least $20 billion” from a $212 billion industry 
(Comprehensive Electricity Competition Plan, http://www.hr.doe.gov/electric/plan.htm).  
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residential users. The price differential in 1999, for example, was almost 50%.4 Some of this 
price differential may reflect real cost savings for industrial customers arising from user-specific 
economies of scale, proximity to high-voltage transmission lines, and a willingness to tolerate 
power interruptions. Another explanation is that some industrial users might generate their own 
electricity if they do not receive sufficient discounts.  
The differential may also arise from large purchasers’ bargaining clout, which may 
extend to political influence in the regulatory system. Well-organized entities often have 
advantages over dispersed consumers in influencing regulators to act on their behalf.5 A large 
actor can even threaten to move offices and production facilities to another state if the public 
utility commission does not give it favorable treatment. Opening electricity markets to 
competition would allow new suppliers to aggregate the purchases of consumers in such a way 
as to match some of the bargaining advantages held by industrial users.  
A final advantage to opening retail markets is that it allows innovative options in the 
purchase and delivery of electricity. 6 One notable example is the marketing of “green power”—
electricity generated in an environmentally friendly way—to consumers willing to pay a 
premium.7 A second example is bundling power with capital equipment for heating, air 
conditioning, and lighting systems into a total package of energy management services for both 
households and businesses. Through these packages, energy companies can best exploit the 
potential for reducing the costs through less expensive generation or investment in more energy-
efficient devices. Competition among providers of these services would, in principle, create 
pressure to transfer the savings to consumers. In particular, consumers would gain even if they 
                                                 
4 In 1999, the average revenue per kilowatt-hour paid by consumers was 8.09 cents; the average revenue from 
industrial users was 4.27 cents (Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, Table 53: 
Estimated U.S. Electric Utility Average Revenue per Kilowatt-hour to Ultimate Consumers by Sector, Census 
Division, and State, November 2000 and 1999, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epm/epmt53p1.html).  
5 Standard references for this proposition are Olson (1965), Stigler (1971), and Peltzman (1976). 
6 For a more detailed discussion of these and other benefits of retail competition over wholesale competition, see 
Bohi and Palmer (1996). 
7 For an instance of policy advocacy of electricity restructuring based on the possibility for green power marketing, 
see Browner (1999). Whether this option would have a significant impact on the environment remains to be seen. If 
one consumer is willing to pay for “green” power and another is indifferent, then the former’s increase in the use of 
such power may be matched by a reduction in its use by the latter, resulting in no net protection of the environment. 
In addition, reliance on green power marketing as an environmental policy tool may not be compatible with 
justifications for such policies that rely on economic theory (Brennan 2000).  Resources for the Future  Brennan, Palmer, and Martinez 
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had not calculated how the benefits in reduced electricity expenditures would offset the cost of 
high-efficiency equipment.8 
III. Background 
A. Industry Characteristics 
The electric power industry has several characteristics that complicate the management of 
restructuring. One is the variety in generation technologies. Electricity is produced using steam 
generators fired by coal, natural gas, oil, and nuclear power. Other electricity turbines are 
powered by hot gases produced from burning oil or natural gas. Gravitational power, harnessed 
through hydroelectric plants, is significant in areas of the country with large rivers. Renewable 
fuels, such as wind, biomass, solar, and geothermal technologies, are a small but growing part of 
the electricity portfolio. The contribution of each of these technologies to electricity generation 
in the United States in 1999 is illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
                                                 
8 This possibility is one main reason why opening markets to competition weakens the case for demand-side 
management policies to subsidize the purchase of high-efficiency appliances and otherwise promote energy 
conservation (Brennan 1998b).  Resources for the Future  Brennan, Palmer, and Martinez 
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Figure 1. Percentage Shares of Electricity Generation by Technology, 1999. 
One reason for the variety in production technologies is geographic. Some generators are 
near coal mines and railroads; others are near gas pipelines. Hydroelectric power requires large 
amounts of running water; wind power requires open spaces with the right climate. Other 
differences are driven by differences in the energy product itself. For the electric power grid to 
operate, electricity has to be produced continuously to meet consumption levels. Some plants can 
and should always be running to provide the “baseload” amount of electricity used more or less 
all the time. Other plants are needed during foreseeable peak periods, whether the variation is 
seasonal (e.g., demand for air conditioning in summer) or related to the time of day (e.g., 
business hours versus late at night). Yet other plants need to be available, with different degrees 
of notice, to adjust supply incrementally or to come on line quickly in case of unexpected surges 
in demand or plant failure. Some technologies can be brought into service more quickly than 
others to meet unexpected needs. 
Different generation technologies are suitable for different kinds of demand. Plants with 
high fixed costs and low operating costs tend to be more useful for meeting baseload demand, 
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demand (Crew and Kleindorfer 1986). A plant designed to power air conditioners during the 
hottest 80 hours of the year has to recover its capital cost in just 1% of the hours of the year, a 
hundred times more quickly than a baseload plant.  
An increasingly important factor in the choice of technologies for generating electricity 
involves pollution regulation. Any plant that burns fossil fuel emits carbon dioxide (CO2), a 
currently unregulated but important contributor to global warming. These plants also may 
produce significant amounts of nitrogen oxide compounds (NOx). Coal plants, particularly those 
that use high-sulfur coal, emit significant amounts of sulfur dioxide (SO2).9 Nuclear plants 
produce none of these emissions but raise concerns about the disposal of spent radioactive fuel 
and the fate of the plants themselves, which become radioactive with use. Hydroelectric power, 
nominally clean, creates concerns about fish spawning routes and flooding of land behind dams. 
The form and stringency of regulations to address these environmental problems affect the mix 
of technologies used to generate electricity.10 
Accompanying the variety in generation technology is variety of organizational forms. 
Before efforts to open power markets, the electricity industry was composed primarily of 
investor-owned utilities (IOUs) that were vertically integrated, from electricity generation 
through long-distance transmission to final distribution and sale. Roughly three-quarters of the 
electricity in the United States was supplied by IOUs. The remainder reached end users through 
distribution systems owned by government entities (referred to as public power, municipally 
owned systems, or “munis”) or on a cooperative basis by the customers themselves. Public 
power companies and co-ops—especially the latter—are found primarily in rural areas; notable 
exceptions include the Los Angeles Department of Power and Water and the Sacramento 
Municipal Utility District system. Public power systems may produce their own electricity or 
obtain it from other sources. They have priority over obtaining power from federally owned 
electricity producers, the largest of which are the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Bonneville 
Power Authority in the Pacific Northwest. 
                                                 
9 For a review of these environmental effects, see Brennan et al. (1996, 112–14). 
10 For some analysis of how environmental regulations of electricity generators can affect technology choice for 
investment and operation in the sector, see Burtraw et al. (2001a and 2001b). Resources for the Future  Brennan, Palmer, and Martinez 
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B. History of Restructuring 11 
Domestic Developments 
For most of its history, the electricity industry has been regulated by the federal and state 
governments. The traditional dividing line between federal and state jurisdiction is that the 
former controls the “wholesale” side of the electricity industry and the latter controls the “retail” 
side. Wholesale generally refers to the production, delivery, and sale of electricity to the 
distribution utilities; retail refers to the prices that residential, commercial, and industrial 
customers actually pay for power. Because most utilities were vertically integrated from 
generation through transmission to distribution and sale to final users, the practical consequence 
was that for the most part, state public utility commissions set electricity rates.  
The story became more complicated when the federal government acted to open the 
wholesale market to nonutility independent power producers. This opening began in 1978 with 
passage of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA). In response to concerns 
regarding energy supplies in the 1970s, precipitated by the growing environmental movement 
and oil price shocks driven by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (and 
exacerbated by regulations), PURPA required utilities to connect so-called qualifying facilities 
(QFs) to their transmission grids. QFs were primarily facilities that produced power using 
renewable fuels or industrial “cogenerators” that produced electricity onsite and could supply 
electricity for use by others. PURPA also required utilities to purchase power from QFs at the 
“avoided cost” of additional utility generators; the states could determine how high the avoided 
cost was and thus how much “outside” power utilities would have to buy. 
PURPA’s effects were not entirely benign. Its implementation in many states led utilities 
to sign long-term contracts with renewable power providers at prices that turned out to be 
considerably in excess of the cost of generating power from conventional facilities. But 
inadvertently, PURPA also showed that wholesale electricity markets could function if nonutility 
generators had access to utility-owned transmission facilities and could get their power to 
                                                 
11 Much of this summary is from Brennan et al. (1996, chapter 2). Resources for the Future  Brennan, Palmer, and Martinez 
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buyers.12 In 1992, Congress passed the Energy Policy Act to extend PURPA’s open-access 
policies to all generators, not only PURPA-defined qualifying facilities. The result of that 
process was Order 888 from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in summer 
1996, which essentially created wholesale power competition throughout the United States.13  
In addition to ordering utilities to open their transmission grids to unaffiliated generators, 
Order 888 requires that the utilities “functionally unbundle” their generation and transmission 
businesses, to prevent anticompetitive favoritism in granting access to affiliated electricity 
producers.14 The form of such unbundling is not specified. It may include anything from separate 
books of account to outright divestiture. The preferred form of organization has been the 
independent system operator (ISO), in which utilities continue to own transmission facilities but 
cede operational authority to an independent board. Order 888 includes desirable rules for ISOs, 
and FERC retains authority to approve or disapprove the specific procedures ISOs choose, but it 
does not mandate ISOs.  
Because it considered the development of ISOs too slow and narrow, FERC issued its 
Order 2000 concerning regional transmission organizations (RTOs), a variation on the ISO 
theme.15 Each utility that owns an interstate transmission facility was required to propose or 
                                                 
12 Literally, the power produced by a particular generator does not go to that generator’s customer. More precisely, 
if a generator sells N kilowatts of power to its customer, it is committing to inject N kilowatts of electricity into the 
overall electricity system at the same time that the customers are taking N kilowatts out. It is as if Starbucks sold M 
cups of coffee by dumping M cups into a common vat, from which its customers had the right to pour M cups of 
coffee.  
The precise description of the market has two notable consequences. The first is that the opportunities to 
differentiate one’s electricity product itself are limited. One cannot sell “higher power” electricity or current that 
alternates at a different speed. Thus, opportunities to differentiate the product have to be based on other factors, such 
as how the power is generated (e.g., renewable versus fossil fuel) or whether it is provided in conjunction with 
capital equipment. 
A second consequence is that the distinction between the central system (the grid) and the power pooled within it 
can become blurry. If coffee were sold as suggested in the Starbucks scenario, the owner of the vat might seek to 
become involved in the wholesale purchase and retail sale of the coffee in it. This blurriness could be especially 
pronounced if the vat owner became responsible for the quality of the coffee supplied—that is, making sure that the 
caffeine jolt was “reliable.” We discuss below how these considerations have affected and may continue to affect the 
development and feasibility of competition in electricity markets.  
13 At the same time, FERC issued Order 889, requiring utilities to institute an Open Access Same-Time Information 
System (OASIS) so that generation companies would have up-to-the-minute information on transmission line prices 
and availability.  
14 See n. 8 supra and accompanying text. 
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participate in an RTO, or explain why it would do neither, by January 15, 2001. In July 2001, 
FERC expressed an intention to collect the transmission facilities under its jurisdiction into four 
RTOs covering virtually the entire continental United States, reflecting the regional nature of 
wholesale electricity markets.16  
FERC’s initiatives in the past five years speak only to wholesale markets, in which 
generation companies compete to sell electricity to firms that resell to final customers. The 
decisions whether, when, and how to extend competition to electricity sales to those final 
consumers—that is, to let households, businesses, and factories choose their power suppliers—
fall to those with authority over retail electricity markets: the states. As of late 2001, about 16 
states (shown in dark gray) were actively engaged in or pursuing electricity competition. In 
addition, seven states (shown in light gray) that had previously decided to implement 
competition have decided to delay implementation. California has suspended retail competition 
for the indefinite future. 
                                                                                                                                                             
15 FERC, Regional Transmission Organizations, Order 2000 (January 6, 2000), 
http://www.ferc.fed.us/news1/rules/pages/order2000.htm. 
16 FERC, Regional Transmission Organizations, Order Initiating Mediation, Docket No. RT01-99-000 (July 12, 
2001), concurring statement of Commissioner Massey at 4, http://www.ferc.gov/Electric/RTO/rto/issuance/rt01-99-
000july.pdf. Note that Texas has a self-contained transmission grid, which is regulated by the state and not by 







Figure 2. State Deregulatory Efforts (DOE).17 
International Developments 
The United States is not the first country in which electricity competition is being 
attempted. Important initiatives have taken place in several other countries, including Chile, New 
Zealand, Australia, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  
One important distinction between restructuring in the United States and electricity 
market reforms abroad is the starting point for these reforms. In the United States, most of the 
electricity has historically been supplied by government-regulated IOUs. Elsewhere, most 
electric utilities have been government owned and operated. Reforms currently underway 
                                                 
17 Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy (November 1, 2001), 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg_str/regmap.html.  Resources for the Future  Brennan, Palmer, and Martinez 
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involve not only a move from regulation to competition but also, in most cases, a move from 
public to private ownership. How to transfer assets (and which assets to transfer) to private 
ownership, whether to privatize transmission and distribution, and how many generating plants 
to offer up in a package can have important implications for the performance of the restructured 
market. 
Countries have adopted different approaches to restructuring and have experienced 
different results. Australia, for example, set up a centralized spot market to handle all sales of 
electricity; New Zealand is relying almost completely on decentralized bilateral markets. When it 
initiated restructuring in the early 1990s, the United Kingdom set up a centralized spot market, 
known as the Pool, to handle all electricity trades, but recently the Pool was abandoned for all 
electricity transactions except those that take place in real time to balance electricity supply and 
demand. This change was made in part to address concerns about the manipulation of the 
electricity spot market by large generators during peak periods and the role of the centralized 
market in making that possible.18 U.K. prices are roughly 20% higher than before the markets 
were opened.19 In other countries, however, opening markets has brought falling energy prices.20 
In anticipation that competition will produce favorable results in the rest of Europe, the European 
Commission is proposing that all consumers in the European Union be able to choose their 
power supplier by 2005.21 
IV. Eleven Leading Issues 
Knowing something about generation and delivery technology, regulatory history, and 
recent restructuring experience allows us to provide some answers to the most compelling 
questions facing electricity policymakers today.  
                                                 
18 For an alternative view of the problems in the U.K. market and how they compare with problems in California, 
see Green (2001). 
19 Competition Commission, AES and British Energy: A Report on References Made under Section 12 of the 
Electricity Act 1989 (2001): 126, http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/docs2001/compcommp2.pdf (chapter 7, The England 
and Wales Wholesale Electricity Market); http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/docs2001/compcommp1.pdf (introduction to 
the report). 
20 For the experience in Norway, see Statistics Norway, Electric Energy Prices, 4th quarter 2000, 
http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/10/08/10/elkraftpris_en/. 
21 See http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc=IP/01/356|0|RAPID&lg=EN. Resources for the Future  Brennan, Palmer, and Martinez 
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1. How—and why—do we draw a line between regulated and competitive sectors of the 
electricity industry? 
In many industries where we have elected to replace regulation with competition, such as 
trucking or banking, we have been able to free most of the industry from continued regulatory 
oversight. But in some sectors—telecommunications, for example—the process of deregulation 
has been only partial, with continued regulation of some segments. If we could just deregulate 
and walk away, the policy task would be much simpler.  
In the electricity industry, only the generation and marketing sectors are ripe for 
deregulation. In those sectors, scale economies appear sufficiently small relative to the size of the 
market to allow multiple vendors to compete.22 The same cannot be said of the wires sectors—
that is, local distribution and long-distance transmission. Local distribution is a monopoly service 
largely because one set of lines, poles, and conduits is sufficient to supply electricity to 
consumers. It would be wasteful for another provider to install its own distribution grid over the 
existing one.  
Transmission is also a monopoly because of the interconnected nature of the transmission 
grid and the high cost of routing electricity across specific lines. Those facts mean that electricity 
essentially takes all uncongested paths from where it is generated to where it is used. 
Consequently, one utility’s ability to transmit electricity depends on the capacity of lines owned 
by others. The grid in practice acts as a single productive facility, even if parts of it are nominally 
owned and operated by separate utilities. 
Until “distributed generation”—that is, the ability of consumers to meet their power 
needs by producing electricity on their premises—becomes more economical, local distribution 
and long-distance transmission are likely to be regulated for the foreseeable future.  
2. Should the same companies own and control both regulated “wires” and competitive 
generation? 
Electricity is not the first deregulated industry to be split into regulated and competitive 
sectors. In the telecommunications industry, all prices were formerly regulated; then, markets for 
telephone equipment and long distance service were opened but local telephone service was, 
                                                 
22 Whether this is in fact true when demand is high relative to capacity in the market is a question we consider 
below. Resources for the Future  Brennan, Palmer, and Martinez 
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until very recently, treated as a regulated monopoly. Our experience with that sector indicated 
that letting a regulated monopoly operate in unregulated markets could subvert competition. The 
regulated firm might favor one customer or make its customers bear the costs of its competitive 
ventures. Ultimately, such situations led in 1984 to the draconian solution of keeping most 
regulated local telephone companies out of the long-distance business, a restriction that has 
begun to change only since the Telecommunications Act of 1996.  
In electricity, state and federal policymakers must wrestle with similar questions. Should 
regulated “wire” monopolies be prevented from owning generation facilities? Can other 
operational institutions and rules ensure that transmission and distribution monopolies promote 
competition without forcing utilities to divest all their generators?  
The widespread use of the term restructuring to describe the introduction of competition 
into the electricity industry illustrates just how fundamental the concerns are. FERC’s promoting 
of ISOs and RTOs shows its interest in addressing those issues, although it has yet to order 
utilities to form such organizations. However, numerous states implementing retail competition 
plans have ordered their utilities to spin off generation, partly to separate generation from 
transmission and distribution, and partly to promote competition between generation companies, 
as noted below  
3. Since we have to regulate prices for the “wires,” how do we set their rates? 
Prior to restructuring, most regulatory effort was devoted to setting the electricity rates 
that users pay. With restructuring, power prices will be set by the market, and prices will directly 
or indirectly include the power prices plus the regulated charges for delivering electricity from 
the generator to the customer. Methods for setting rates for transmission and distribution include 
both traditional “rate-of-return” regulation and new “incentive-based” methods that could lead to 
lower costs and more efficient operation.  
Although the two methods apply to both distribution and transmission, the latter presents 
difficult problems. A generator may have to go through lines owned by several utilities in 
multiple states. Consequently, policymakers have to consider whether transmission prices should 
be set by broad geographic regions and be independent of distance, or include charges that 
increase with distance or the number of times the path crosses a state line or uses a different 
utility’s facilities. Absent congestion, and apart from energy losses borne by the generators, the 
marginal cost of using a transmission grid is virtually zero. Rates might nonetheless be based on 
distance to provide some appropriate incentives about where to locate new generating plants.  Resources for the Future  Brennan, Palmer, and Martinez 
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When lines are congested, theory suggests route-based or “nodal” pricing, reflecting 
complexities related to the physical laws that determine how electricity flows over multiple 
interconnected paths from generator to customer. If transmission providers keep congestion 
rents, they have incentives not to expand lines. Transferring rents away (e.g., to generators 
through markets in “congestion rights”) may leave ISOs or transmission companies with 
insufficient funds or incentive to expand.  
4. How do we keep electricity markets competitive? 
The belief that opening retail markets will lead to lower prices and better service for 
households, offices, and industrial users is predicated on the belief that electricity generation 
markets will be competitive. Such markets may fail to be competitive if only one or a small 
number of firms supply power to a particular area, or if the power producers agree among 
themselves not to compete. As we observe an industry in flux, with numerous mergers, 
divestitures, entrants, and volatile prices, how to ensure competition becomes an ever more 
pressing question.  
The antitrust laws are the main legal devices in the United States for keeping markets 
competitive. But those laws were not designed to control markets like electric power, where 
monopolies arose as a matter of prior regulation. A first policy step to promote competition, 
already implemented in some states, could be to require divestiture of power plants to increase 
the number of independent competitors.  
One concern, presented by the California electricity crisis, is that generators may 
unilaterally find it profitable to withhold output in order to raise prices, even when the markets 
appear competitive by conventional structural indicators. Such concerns have been behind calls 
for temporary federal caps on wholesale prices. As we note below, however, evidence supporting 
assertions of market power needs to be interpreted with care, and wholesale price caps, 
particularly during peak periods, could become a permanent feature of “deregulated” wholesale 
electricity markets.  
Mergers among some former competitors could enable the merged firms to raise prices 
on their own, facilitate collusion among all the competitors, or make competition less intense. 
Deciding whether to block a merger requires understanding who competes with whom, how 
competitive the market might be, and who might enter if the price goes up. Fluctuations in short- 
and long-term demand across locations coupled with the physical characteristics of the electricity 
grid complicate evaluations of proposed mergers in electricity. In some cases, mergers between a Resources for the Future  Brennan, Palmer, and Martinez 
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generation company and a gas supplier could cause problems if the gas company is a primary 
supplier to that generation company’s competitors. Finally, while the industry is in transition, 
merger evaluation could be so speculative that antitrust authorities may be unable to prove that a 
merger may be harmful.   
5. Who should be responsible for keeping loads balanced and dispatching power? 
With electricity, unlike virtually every other commodity, disaster can strike unless 
producers supply exactly the amount that people want to buy at any given time. A first question 
is whether each generation company should be responsible for keeping its own power supply in 
balance with its own customers’ desires. Since failure to meet power demands causes a 
breakdown of the system as a whole, and not just a blackout to that company’s customers, letting 
the market take care of it may not suffice. Generators may need to meet standards for 
maintaining power and having reserves available, or they may need to be held liable when their 
inability to meet demand brings down the larger grid. If those standards prove inadequate, 
distribution and transmission companies may need to take on the responsibility of providing 
ancillary services and holding power in reserve. 
Involving grid operators in the business of maintaining loads has led many states and 
regions to involve them in the overall management of power markets, through taking bids from 
producers and users and dispatching generators as needed. Examples include the PJM 
independent system operator in the mid-Atlantic states and the New England and New York 
ISOs. The grid need not be involved in this aspect of controlling generation costs; the electricity 
market, like any other, can handle that through letting generators compete for customers. But 
whether such a market is compatible with keeping loads balanced and systems secure is perhaps 
the crucial question facing electricity policymakers. We return to this issue below. 
6. As utilities compete, how can we ensure reliability?  
The U.S. electric power system has had a strong record of uninterrupted service made 
possible through the cooperative efforts of the utilities linked on its three major transmission 
grids. Since the establishment of the North American Electric Reliability Council and its regional 
affiliates in 1968, electric utilities throughout Canada and the United States have worked 
together to establish and implement voluntary operating rules and procedures to keep power 
flowing continually throughout the region. As the electric power industry becomes more 
competitive, this voluntary approach to ensuring reliable service is threatened at the same time 
that the transmission system is facing greater stress from more intensive use. Resources for the Future  Brennan, Palmer, and Martinez 
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Restructuring poses challenges for the reliability of both the distribution system and the 
bulk power transmission system. The threats to its integrity and the consequences of failure are 
greater for the transmission system than for a local distribution grid. To maintain the security of 
the bulk power transmission system, power control area operators and security coordinators may 
need to interfere with the commercial transactions on the electricity grid. Distinguishing an 
action taken to protect system security from an action taken for other reasons, perhaps 
anticompetitive ones, may be difficult.  
Given the potential threats to reliability posed by electricity restructuring, legislators and 
energy regulators should develop a strategy for protecting system reliability as they design and 
implement policies that set the course for electricity markets in the future. Such a strategy is 
likely to include expanding the role of industry reliability councils, regional transmission 
organizations, and federal regulators in overseeing reliability, and using incentives to promote 
efficient use of the transmission and distribution systems. 
7. Should the states or the federal government set the course of retail electricity 
competition? 
So far, state governments have been the key actors in developing and implementing 
policies to encourage retail electricity competition. A policy question has been whether states are 
acting quickly enough, or whether the federal government should step in to encourage or force 
them to open markets by a particular time.23  
Keeping control with the states allows the nation as a whole to learn from what works 
(and what doesn’t). One size may not fit all, and the benefits of opening markets may be 
considerably greater in some states than others. Indeed, in other countries with federal 
governments, including Canada and Australia, electricity restructuring was initially delegated 
handled at the provincial or state level.24 In addition, imposing a federal solution would require 
                                                 
23 The Clinton administration’s Comprehensive Electricity Competition Plan would have forced states to either open 
electricity markets by January 2003 or formally “opt out” through some sort of public proceeding. For a summary 
and evaluation, see Brennan (1998a). A version of this plan was introduced by Senator Murkowski as the 
Comprehensive Electricity Competition Act (S. 1047) in 1999. It did not pass. 
24 In Australia, a national wholesale market was subsequently established beginning in 1997 with the harmonization 
of the Victorian and combined New South Wales–Australian Capital Territory wholesale electricity markets 
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amending or reversing the delicately balanced solutions achieved by states that are already 
opening their retail markets. 
However, a presumption that state actions reflect a proper balance of interests is less 
convincing when that state’s decisions have effects that go beyond its boundaries. When 
interstate effects are significant, the federal government can help improve policies by serving as 
a venue where each affected party has a say. Specific areas in which the federal government can 
play an effective role include reforming federal laws that may inhibit competition, regulating 
interstate transmission grid prices and operation, ensuring market liquidity, enforcing antitrust 
and environmental laws, and coordinating commercial standards and practices. Also, states 
themselves may be able to negotiate solutions and set up regional authorities to manage issues 
that affect an entire region but not the nation as a whole. 
8. What should be the role of public power after restructuring? 
Unlike most of the other industries that have made the transition from regulation to 
competition, the electricity sector has a substantial nonprofit component. Roughly 25% of all 
retail electricity sales in the United States comes from publicly or cooperatively owned utilities. 
The combination of privately and publicly owned utilities (at local, state, and federal levels of 
government) operating under different objectives and rules greatly complicates the task of 
restructuring this industry. 
The debate over bringing competition to electricity generation and retail sales markets 
has highlighted several differences between publicly and cooperatively owned utilities and 
investor-owned utilities. These differences can be categorized into three types:  
•  Financial. The privileges granted to public utilities and cooperatives include 
preferential access to low-cost hydroelectric power produced at federally owned 
facilities, the ability to issue tax-exempt debt, and exemption from income tax 
payments.  
•  Regulatory. Differences include limits on the ability of publicly and cooperatively 
owned utilities to participate in the operation and governance of ISOs and RTOs. 
•  Purpose. Many federally owned hydroelectric facilities have multiple purposes, such 
as flood or navigational control, in addition to electricity production.  
How public power will evolve in this era of competition remains an open question to be 
decided at different levels of government. Policymakers need to address the above differences as Resources for the Future  Brennan, Palmer, and Martinez 
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they seek to promote competition and efficiency. The federal government will be responsible for 
redefining roles for the federal power marketing authorities and for the Tennessee Valley 
Authority. Decisions about whether municipal utilities or rural cooperatives will continue to hold 
an exclusive franchise for retail electricity sales are best made at the local level.  
9. Will it cost utilities to adapt to competition, and if so, who should pay? 
Prior to the California electricity crisis, perhaps the most controversial issue associated 
with opening electricity markets to competition was whether and how to compensate utilities for 
capital expenses they incurred during the regulatory era. If competition brings about lower 
prices, as its advocates hope, utilities fear that they may not make enough money to recover 
some costs—hence that these costs would be stranded. The primary sources of stranded costs, 
once estimated at more than $135 billion, are associated with nuclear power plants and long-term 
contracts to purchase renewable and cogenerated power under PURPA.25  
Utility advocates argue that a “regulatory compact” implicitly guaranteed cost recovery 
as part of the utilities’ obligations to provide service. Those opposed to stranded cost recovery 
allege that utilities should not be rewarded for unwise investments, and that forcing consumers to 
pay for stranded costs will thwart the objective of reducing electricity rates. In principle, the 
resolution should turn on a determination of whether regulators or utilities were in the better 
position to foresee restructuring, and which of them were better able to adapt to the prospect of 
competition.  
As a practical matter, stranded cost recovery has generally been part of the package 
necessary to build sufficient political support to open retail markets. In addition, the federal 
government supports stranded cost recovery—perhaps not incidentally because the federal 
government is itself exposed by virtue of its ownership of electricity generation in the Tennessee 
Valley and Pacific Northwest.  Surcharges on electricity purchases used to recover stranded costs 
should preserve competitive neutrality—that is, the recovery mechanism should not create 
artificial cost advantages for either incumbent utilities or new merchant generators. Designing 
such a recovery system may be easier said than done. 
                                                 
25 For a more extensive discussion of the economic issues associated with stranded cost recovery and the 
interpretation of incomplete contracts between regulators and utilities, see Brennan and Boyd (1997). Resources for the Future  Brennan, Palmer, and Martinez 
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10. What are the implications of restructuring for environmental protection?  
Electricity generation is a major source of air pollution in the United States. Electricity 
generators that burn fossil fuels contribute substantially to urban ozone and other pollution 
problems in U.S. cities, to acid rain in the Northeast, and to regional haze and visibility problems 
in some rural areas. They also contribute to the buildup of greenhouse gases in the earth’s 
atmosphere, and thus ignite concerns about global warming. Generators that burn coal, fuel oil, 
or municipal solid waste emit mercury, exposure to which has been linked to neurobehavioral 
dysfunction.  
 
The contribution of electricity generation to emissions of specific pollutants is illustrated 
in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. Electricity Industry Share of Total Emissions  
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In the midst of searching for new ways to reduce air pollution in general, environmental 
regulators and other policymakers are eager to understand how increased competition in 
electricity markets is likely to affect the size of that sector’s contribution to different air pollution 
problems. The effect of electricity restructuring on the amount of air pollution emitted by 
electricity generators will depend on the amount of electricity produced and the mix of 
technologies used to produce it, along with the form of existing environmental regulations 
governing electricity generators. If prices fall and demand increases, emissions will rise, ceteris 
paribus. If competition leads to greater use of older generators that face fewer pollution 
restrictions, emissions will again rise. On the other hand, if restructuring encourages investment 
in new, cleaner generators, emissions will fall. If total emissions are capped, as they are for SO2, 
restructuring will have no effect on emissions.  
Prior research suggests that competition could lead to greater emissions of pollutants not 
subject to strict caps, such as carbon dioxide, unless additional policies make the use of 
renewables and other low-emitting technologies more attractive (Palmer 1997; Palmer 2001; 
Burtraw et al. 2001). Opening electricity markets is also likely to affect the performance of 
environmental regulation. Competition will likely limit voluntary actions to reduce emissions. At 
the same time it will enhance incentives for electricity generators to take advantage of emissions 
trading.  
11. What happens to utility-funded “public benefit” programs in a competitive electricity 
market? 
Regulated electric utilities have historically performed several public service functions in 
addition to selling electricity. These include energy conservation (demand-side management, or 
DSM) programs, industry-wide research and development (R&D) of more efficient generating 
technologies, support for renewable generating technologies, and subsidies for low-income 
consumers. All of these programs existed because regulators have, for the most part, allowed the 
regulated utility to recover the costs in the prices that it charged. 
In the newly competitive environment, utilities face greater pressures to reduce costs and 
are therefore reducing discretionary spending on activities that don’t contribute directly to 
profits. At the same time, competition brings with it important changes in the incentives facing 
electricity suppliers and consumers that could eliminate or reduce the need for certain public Resources for the Future  Brennan, Palmer, and Martinez 
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purpose programs.26 For example, competition is expected to lead to more time-of-day pricing of 
electricity and a closer association between electricity prices and marginal costs, thereby 
reducing the need for DSM programs to encourage efficiency-enhancing energy conservation. 
Competition could bring more consumer awareness and understanding of the value of the 
savings associated with energy efficiency investments—the lack of which has long justified 
utility support. Restructuring could also result in more R&D into process innovations and new 
products that promise higher returns to competitive firms; but it might also discourage research 
that benefits the public and thus justify public R&D programs. The other public purpose 
programs, such as low-income support, remain largely unaffected by restructuring, although the 
number of households in need of assistance could be smaller if restructuring significantly lowers 
electricity prices. 
Restructuring will also require change in the funding for some public purpose programs 
to make them feasible and competitively neutral.27 The most common funding mechanism that 
states have used is the nonbypassable wires charge levied on all retail electricity customers who 
take electricity off the distribution system. Tying the funding mechanism to a regulated service 
that even self-generators must use for backup power makes it virtually impossible to bypass, 
unlike mechanisms that tie funding to sales of electric power by utilities but not by their 
competitors. Another mechanism being adopted in some regions to promote renewables use is a 
renewable portfolio standard (RPS), a standard that specifies the minimum percentage of all 
electricity generated (or sold) within a region that must come from renewable sources. The RPS 
can be combined with a system of tradable renewable generation credits allowing the market to 
identify the least-cost way to satisfy the renewable obligation. 
                                                 
26 For a more complete discussion about the role of utility DSM programs in a competitive electricity market, see 
Brennan (1998b). 
27 For an in-depth discussion about the role of public purpose programs in a restructured electricity market, see Fox-
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V. The California Crisis28 
A. What Happened 
Electricity restructuring in California began in April 1998. California Assembly Bill 
1890, the law that opened entry into retail markets, established two new institutions: an ISO to 
manage the California transmission system and procure power as needed to maintain load 
balances in real time, and an independent Power Exchange (PX) in which most power would be 
traded. The legislation also established a nonbypassable transition charge that would allow 
incumbent utilities to recover stranded costs. Retail prices charged to electricity consumers were 
capped until the incumbent distribution utility collected sufficient revenue to recover its stranded 
costs, at which point retail prices would be completely unregulated. 
For about the first two years, restructuring worked well from the standpoints of prices 
and reliability. Figure 4 indicates that until June 2000, electricity prices in California remained 
fairly low. Wholesale prices ranged roughly between 1 cent and 3.5 cents per kilowatt-hour off-
peak, and peak prices were roughly a penny higher. 
                                                 
































Figure 4.California Wholesale Electricity Prices, April 1998–October 2000. 
A similar sense of the performance of the market can be gleaned from looking at the 
number of times reserves were declared to be precariously low, referred to by the California ISO 
as “staged emergencies.” Figure 5 shows that before summer 2000, such emergencies were 
virtually nonexistent; they occurred only during summer months, and the most declared in any 
one month was three. At no time during that period did blackouts related to systemic imbalances 








































Figure 5. Staged Emergencies in California, April 1998–October 2000. 
As the figures show, the turn for the worse began around June 2000. Peak and off-peak 
wholesale prices began to spike to levels nearly ten times those reached during the previous two 
years. Because San Diego Gas and Electric Company’s retail rates had been deregulated, these 
wholesale prices prompted reports of a near tripling of retail electric bills compared with summer 
1999, leading to reregulation in September 2000, retroactive to the previous summer. Then came 
a threat of blackouts throughout the state.  
While wholesale electricity prices ballooned, retail price ceilings on the IOUs left the 
utilities unable to cover their expenses, and by fall the deficit exceeded $14 billion. As the 
utilities teetered closer to bankruptcy, power producers became less willing to sell them 
electricity. Prices in winter 2001 continued at levels about ten times the 1999 average, even 
though winter is typically an off-peak season for electricity demand in California.  
Alerts became much more frequent, with increasing power interruptions and some rolling 
blackouts in northern California. Citing a FERC order forcing it to “implement a $150 
breakpoint” that, apparently, was below the price at which generators were willing to offer 
power, the California PX suspended operation on January 31, 2001.29 Within two weeks, a 
                                                 
29 California Power Exchange press release, CalPX to Suspend Day-Ahead, Day-of-Market Operations, January 30, 
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federal district judge forced generators to continue to sell power to the utilities, despite the 
utilities’ failure to maintain an “approved credit rating.”30 
B. California and FERC Responses 
As the financial status of the distribution utilities worsened, the state government 
reluctantly began to act. The legislature authorized the state to purchase power, finance plant 
construction and retrofitting, fund conservation programs, and sell power directly to retail 
customers.31 The governor further proposed that the state would apply cost-plus regulation to 
power supplied by utility-owned plants, and consumers who purchased from those utilities would 
be unable to switch.32 To alleviate some of the pressure on the market created by caps on NOx 
emissions, California regulators lifted limits, allowing generators to emit NOx at a price of $7.50 
per pound, one-fifth the price to which NOx emissions allowances had risen during the crisis 
(Joskow and Kahn 2001a). The California Public Utility Commission decided that to cover the 
cost of electricity, it would raise power rates, particularly to industrial and commercial 
customers, by 40% (Lazarus 2001).  
California and the federal government, primarily FERC, continued to dispute the degree 
to which generators had violated federal statutes requiring that wholesale electricity prices be 
“just and reasonable.” In March 2001, FERC found evidence of overcharging during peak 
demand periods and ordered $69 million in refunds for overcharges during emergency conditions 
in January 2001.33 Disagreeing, the California ISO provided studies indicating that prices were 
high all the time and estimating overcharges during that month of $1.364 billion, almost 20 times 
FERC’s estimate (Hildebrandt 2001). For Pacific Gas and Electric, the utility that serves much of 
northern California, these responses may have been too little, too late; it filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection on April 6, 2001. 
Later in April 2001, FERC issued an order requiring power producers to bid on all 
available power to the ISO and capped wholesale electricity prices in California during periods 
                                                 
30 California ISO v. Reliant Energy et al., No. CIV. S-01-238 (E. Dist. California, February 8, 2001). This and 
related decisions are available at www.caed.us.courts.gov. 
31 AB 1X, passed January 31, 2001. 
32 Transcript of press conference, Governor Gray Davis (February 16, 2001). 
33 Order Directing Sellers to Provide Refunds, San Diego Gas and Electric Co. v. Sellers of Energy, FERC Docket 
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when unused reserve capacity was tight.34 About two months later, FERC expanded this policy 
to set caps on wholesale power at all times, throughout all of the western United States rather 
than just California.35 When reserves were low, the cap would be based on the cost of the most 
expensive gas-fired generator; at other times, the cap would be 85% of the price set during the 
most recent preceding period of low reserves. The price caps are scheduled to remain until 
September 2002.  
While FERC was taking a stronger role in the market, it continued to be embroiled in the 
dispute regarding the size of refunds due California. Under the auspices of FERC’s chief 
administrative law judge, settlement talks between California and the generators took place in 
June and July 2001. The talks proved unsuccessful: representatives of the state sought refunds 
more than ten times what the generators, in the aggregate, were willing to pay.36  
As summer 2001 began, reliability experts forecast that California might suffer as much 
as 260 hours of rolling blackouts (NERC 2001). Surprisingly, California got through the summer 
without a power outage, with August prices falling to $53 per megawatt-hour, about a third to a 
quarter of levels the preceding year.37 The ability of the state to avoid serious problems was 
attributed to a variety of causes. Some of the credit goes to an unusually effective conservation 
campaign, which reduced electricity consumption in California more than 12% compared with 
the previous summer (NRDC 2001). Another major contributor was milder-than-expected 
weather (Kahn 2001). Nevertheless, the state continued to walk away from its deregulation 
efforts. On September 20, 2001, the California Public Utility Commission voted to end giving 
electricity consumers the ability to choose their electricity suppliers (Gaudette 2001).   
                                                 
34 Order Establishing Prospective Mitigation and Monitoring Plan for the California Wholesale Electricity Markets 
and Establishing and Investigation of Public Utility Rates in Wholesale Western Electricity Markets, San Diego Gas 
and Electric Co. v. Sellers of Energy, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Docket No. EL00 95-031, issued 
April 26, 2001, at 10, 14–15, available at http://www.ferc.gov/electric/bulkpower/el00-95-012A.pdf. 
35 Order on Rehearing of Marketing and Mitigation Plan for the California Wholesale Electricity Markets, 
Establishing West-Wide Mitigation, and Establishing Settlement Conference, San Diego Gas and Electric Co. v. 
Sellers of Energy, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Docket No. EL00 95-031, issued July 12, 2001, at 4–7, 
24–25, 35–36, 41–42 , available at http://www.ferc.gov/electric/bulkpower/el00-95-031-6-19.PDF. 
36 Report and Recommendation of Chief Judge of Record, San Diego Gas and Electric Co. v. Sellers of Energy, 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Docket No. EL00 95-031, issued July 12, 2001, at 3, available at 
http://www.ferc.gov/electric/bulkpower/EL00-95-031_7-12-01.pdf. 
37 California Power Costs Continue to Tumble in August, Reuters (September 19, 2001), 
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C. Explanations for the Crisis 
Many explanations have been offered for what happened in California. Were it possible 
to convert explanations into electricity, California’s dilemma would disappear. Clearly, no single 
explanation is sufficient; the blackouts and price spikes were the result of numerous factors. We 
identify ten potential culprits (listed in no particular order): 
•  Supply-and-demand imbalances. The capacity to produce and deliver electricity to 
users in California failed to keep up with growth in demand. During the 1990s, 
demand for electricity in California grew more than 11% while capacity fell slightly. 
The supply crunch was exacerbated by a lack of rainfall in the western United States, 
reducing hydroelectric power supplies in summer 2000 to less than 75% of 1999 
levels. These factors, combined with the very inelastic demand for power and the 
inability to store electricity, provided a sure recipe for significant increases in 
wholesale prices and blackouts. 
•  Higher fuel costs. Prices for power rose because the fuels used to produce it, 
particularly natural gas, became more expensive. According to FERC, natural gas 
prices nearly tripled in the western United States during 2000. This fuel price 
increase, combined with the need to bring particularly inefficient plants on line to 
meet demand during peak periods, contributed to the increase in electricity prices. 
•  Supply-reducing regulations. Rules restricting the construction of generators and 
emissions of particular pollutants reduced electricity supplies and raised generation 
costs. As electricity became more expensive, demand for permits to emit nitrogen 
oxides in the south coastal region of California rose, allowing those who owned 
permits to earn scarcity rents. Rules governing power plant siting and requiring 
emissions offsets may have also inhibited investment in new generators. Some 
environmental advocates, however, deny that environmental regulations have had 
much effect on power plant construction and suggest that general regulatory 
uncertainty may be a bigger factor in inhibiting investment.  
•  Wholesale price regulation. Beginning in December 2000 and continuing until June 
2001, FERC issued a series of increasingly stringent price controls. These caps may 
have helped alleviate a politically undesirable redistribution of wealth from 
consumers to generators. Limiting or threatening to cap the prices a generator could 
charge for power, however, can discourage supply. Unwillingness of generators to Resources for the Future  Brennan, Palmer, and Martinez 
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abide by caps imposed in December 2000 led in part to the closure of the California 
Power Exchange in late January 2001. 
•  Retail price controls. Holding down retail prices kept demand high during peak 
periods and brought distribution utilities to or over the brink of bankruptcy when they 
had to purchase wholesale power at high prices. Low retail rates also discouraged 
conservation that might have eased the stress on the power system. Utilities lost 
billions of dollars when they had to purchase wholesale power at prices five times or 
more the capped retail rate. The political turmoil associated with the still 
undetermined question of who will cover the utilities’ losses contributed as much as 
anything to California’s crisis. 
•  Inframarginal rent transfer. Competition makes prices, and hence costs, visible to 
consumers. Under regulation, peak costs were not visible because prices were 
calculated by averaging them with lower costs in off-peak periods. Moving from 
regulation to competition implied that when prices began to rise to cover the cost of 
the “marginal” firm, all suppliers were able to charge that high price, redistributing 
wealth from consumers to producers. This transfer is politically upsetting, as seen in 
the uproar over higher retail rates in San Diego during the three months in 2000 when 
rates were unregulated. The long-term solution is for more plants to come on line, 
reducing off-peak power prices and bringing revenues during peak periods to a level 
just sufficient to cover capital costs. 
•  Absence of real-time metering Electricity may cost ten or more times as much to 
produce on a hot summer afternoon as it costs later the same evening. But standard 
meters, which tell only how much electricity one uses per month, do not allow time-
of-day pricing. This precluded setting power prices high during peak-use periods and 
thus removed an important incentive to conserve power and reschedule uses for times 
when electricity was more plentiful (Borenstein 2001).  
•  Lack of long-term contracts. Rules requiring distribution utilities to buy power from 
the PX discouraged them from insuring against high wholesale prices through long-
term contracts. If the dramatic increase in wholesale prices in summer 2000 had not 
been predicted, the utilities might have been able to obtain favorable long-term 
supply contracts at reasonably low prices and thus avoided the financial strains of 
having to buy power in the short-term market. A more salient question may be 
whether the absence of long-term contracts hurt electricity production. Long-term Resources for the Future  Brennan, Palmer, and Martinez 
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contracting for electricity could encourage greater consumption at a lower contract 
price and discourage conservation. 
•  Auction design. Instituting an auction in which suppliers get the highest bid price may 
have created incentives to “game” the system. The PX ran an auction in which, for 
every hour of the day, each generator could specify up to 16 prices and the amounts 
of electricity it would sell at those prices. The PX would find the price at which the 
amount generators offered equaled the quantity demanded, and each generator would 
get the market clearing price for each kilowatt-hour produced. Although it is efficient 
to give all bidders the market clearing price, the auction structure may have given 
generators a strategic incentive to bid a little bit of power at a very high price. If the 
bid for that power is not taken, the generator loses the profits from only a small 
amount of sales. If the bid is taken, the generator reaps a windfall, receiving that high 
price on all of its output.  
•  Market power. Through collective action or unilateral conduct, generators may have 
charged prices substantially above the competitive level. In principle, fixing prices of 
electricity, a standardized commodity, may be relatively easy. But the sheer number 
of competitors in the California wholesale market would seem to make collusion 
difficult. A more likely possibility is that generators unilaterally had the ability and 
incentive to withhold output and raise prices. Some studies find that electricity prices 
were above the average variable cost of generating power, but these need to be 
interpreted with care (Joskow and Kahn 2001a, 2001b). Peak-period prices would 
normally cover not only variable costs but capital costs as well. Moreover, the prices 
charged may have been inflated to compensate for the possibility that bankrupt 
utilities would not be able to pay their bills.  
D. Lessons from California 
The main question on the minds of observers is whether the situation in California will be 
repeated elsewhere. Perhaps the most crucial determinant is the overall supply-and-demand 
situation in each state or region, taking into account generation capacity, fuel prices, and 
transmission availability on the supply side and population and economic growth on the demand 
side. These factors may have little to do with restructuring. The California experience does offer 
some lessons, however, that those charged with implementing retail competition might consider.  Resources for the Future  Brennan, Palmer, and Martinez 
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Retail Price Controls 
A first suggestion would be to lift retail price controls. If there is sufficient concern about 
retail market power to warrant retail price caps, lest incumbent utilities or their spinoffs dominate 
retailing and discourage potential competitors, continued regulation should allow pass-through of 
wholesale prices, particularly during periods of peak demand. If peak-period prices continue to 
be held below cost by regulation, use nonmarket mechanisms to encourage conservation (e.g., 
public demand-side management programs directed at peak-use equipment). If peak-period 
rolling blackouts cannot be restricted to relatively low-valued uses of electricity, consider ways 
to encourage variable pricing or its equivalent (e.g., subsidized real-time meters and interruptible 
service contracts). 
Market Design  
A first step in improving market design would be to remove any regulatory impediments 
to long-term contracting between retailers and generators. To discourage anticompetitive 
conduct, opportunities for long-term contracting should be offered first to retailers not affiliated 
with distribution utilities. If long-term contracting among unaffiliated retailers is not adequate, 
consider ordering distribution utilities to divest their retail operations to become passive, 
regulated-wires companies. Such a divestiture could create more than one retail company, to 
limit the need for retail price controls. A second solution would be minimum bid quantity 
requirements, to increase the risk associated with bidding in a small amount of power at a very 
high price. 
Given the merits of direct dealing between purchasers and suppliers of electricity, one 
might want to eliminate central auctions for everything but ancillary services and information 
provision necessary to maintain system integrity. If such auctions need to be retained, consider 
requirements that a substantial minimum quantity be bid in at any given price, or that a supplier 
must bid in all of its output at the same price to prevent gaming. 
Peak-Period Pricing 
Regulators should consider eliminating impediments to allowing utilities to set power 
prices on a time-of-day basis. A major reason price spikes are so severe during peak periods is 
that consumers who pay average power prices will act as though the cost of power is always the 
same. Time-of-day pricing can lessen the severity of price spikes and encourage conservation by 
reducing wasteful uses of power during peak periods. Subsidizing time-of-day metering might be Resources for the Future  Brennan, Palmer, and Martinez 
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justified if the alternative is to ration power through blackouts. Making users more sensitive to 
price may also discourage generators from withholding output in order to raise prices.  
Environmental Policy 
It may be necessary to factor higher electricity prices into the cost-benefit calculation in 
assessing environmental regulations involving pollution. This should not be a license to ignore 
environmental costs, any more than we should ignore the costs of building power plants, the fuel 
to feed them, and the labor to operate them. But these benefits should be balanced against the 
cost of making electricity more expensive to produce and perhaps making electricity markets less 
open to competition from new suppliers.  
Market Power and Wholesale Price Caps 
If evidence supports the view that generators have market power, empower FERC or 
public utility commissions to order additional divestitures to deconcentrate the market, since the 
antitrust laws do not limit a firm’s ability to reduce output unilaterally in order to raise price. 
Regulation of output could be considered, for example, through a “sick day” limit on outages, as 
suggested by Frank Wolak (2001).  
The main controversy is over the need to cap wholesale prices to limit market power. The 
best case for capping wholesale power prices is if generators can unilaterally exercise significant 
market power or if an auction conducive to placing high bids is in place. Caps are not necessary 
to control collusion; agreements to fix electricity prices are already illegal under the antitrust 
laws. Using a cap as a kind of windfall profits tax may be appealing, but caution is warranted. 
However well intentioned, wholesale price caps may discourage production and encourage 
consumption, putting the system at greater risk and turning a price spike into an emergency 
blackout, unless generators are holding power off the market in order to raise prices.  
In addition, expectations that wholesale price caps are only “temporary” may not be 
borne out. To cover costs, generators will have to earn capacity rents in peak periods; earning 
capacity rents implies inelastic supply. If demand is inelastic, too, generators with an otherwise 
small share (10% to 20%) of the market will find it profitable to withhold output in order to raise 
prices above the competitive level. If supracompetitive pricing warrants price caps, then caps 
may be around as long as there are peak periods and capacity rents in electricity and generation 
companies have more than trivial market shares. Unless generation capacity is unprofitably 
overbuilt or electricity demand becomes more responsive to price, “temporary” price caps may 
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33 
VI. Other Political Battles 
Controversies over price spikes, retail electricity rates, rolling blackouts, and utility 
bankruptcies are not the only political battles facing policymakers and the public in deciding 
whether and when to restructure. 
A. Marketers versus Customers 
The effectiveness of restructuring will also depend on whether electricity customers 
believe they can get what they want from those who sell them power. Some concern follows 
from the experience with telecommunications. A common reaction among the public is whether 
electricity competition means that dinner will be interrupted by even more telemarketing calls. 
Perhaps more concrete have been allegations of “slamming”—switching a customer from 
another provider to oneself without the customer’s consent—and “cramming”—billing for 
services that the customer did not select. Last and not least is a concern that trying to compare 
the price and service offerings of different providers is often daunting. 
State and federal policymakers are well aware of those concerns. Some have proposed 
regulations that would require generators to make a uniform presentation of price and pollution 
data, akin to the nutritional charts on food packages. Such data may help a consumer decide 
which generation company best matches his or her preferences for low price and environmental 
protection. State regulators, individually and collectively, are considering new rules governing 
marketing and other business practices to prevent slamming and cramming. Regulators will also 
have to consider how to adapt “cut off” protections—when a consumer whose bills are overdue 
loses access to electricity—to an era when generators, transmission companies, and local 
distributors each have separate claims to the customer’s account.  
A more daunting policy consideration is whether consumers would rather let the 
government choose their power provider and regulate its rates or choose for themselves and rely 
on competition to set rates. Again, telecommunications offers some precedents. In a market 
economy, consumers presumably prefer having options, especially when competition among the 
possibilities leads to lower prices and better service. But a commonly heard complaint following 
the AT&T divestiture in 1984 was that after years of having no choice, consumers were unhappy 
about having to pick a long-distance company.  
Policies predicated on purported dislike for having to make choices need to be 
implemented with care. Reducing choices in the name of customer convenience can lead to more 
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benefit. We wonder how many consumers would go back to the predivestiture days of just one 
telephone company, and whether they would currently like a world with only one cellular 
telephone or Internet service provider.  
Depriving consumers of options in electricity may preclude them from enjoying the 
potential benefits of packaged energy management services or from exercising preferences for 
green power. Nevertheless, consumer aversion to choice in electricity remains a phenomenon 
sufficiently significant to warrant the attention of regulators as they consider when and whether 
to open retail power markets. And, of course, choice is meaningful only when consumers have 
more than one supplier from which to choose.  
B. High-Cost versus Low-Cost States 
Opening power markets, at either the wholesale or the retail level, means that power 
companies in one state will find it easier to sell power in other states. The predictable outcome is 
that power prices will tend to become more equal across states, reducing enormous differentials 
in which customers in high-cost states (prederegulation California, New York) may pay double 
or triple the price for electricity paid in low-cost states (Washington, Kentucky). This price 
equalization can be a boon for electricity customers in high-cost states, but it may well lead to 
higher prices for the consumers—and higher profits for the companies—in low-cost states. 
People in low-cost states will be competing with customers in high-cost states for power; they 
will no longer be able to keep it for themselves.  
In principle, the gains to the power companies in exporting states could be redistributed 
to customers in a way that makes everyone better off. In practice, redistributing these gains in an 
effective and efficient manner will not be easy. Taxing in-state sales will only encourage exports, 
making matters worse for in-state consumers. Taxing exports can restore the status quo, but in 
doing so, it defeats the benefits to the nation as a whole from increasing access to low-cost power 
sources. Taxing profits themselves would likely discourage low-cost producers from expanding 
their operations and reduce the national electric power bill. 
VII. The Central Problem: Reliability versus Competition 
 Reforming regulation, controlling market power, securing environmental benefits, and 
avoiding a repeat of the California crisis are all major challenges facing policymakers. Most of 
the problems in California and elsewhere are among those we know how to solve or prevent. 
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power. Mistakes in the design of residual regulation and centralized auctions can be avoided. The 
most difficult items in the list (those dealing with supply-and-demand imbalances) will be with 
us, perhaps more intensely, even if retail regulation continues.  
In many cases, to be sure, implementing the best policy requires getting adequate data 
and balancing political interests, neither of which is easy. And markets can take time to adjust, 
especially when the ultimate benefits depend on the construction of large capital projects, such as 
new generators and expanded transmission lines. But these are the kinds of problems we as a 
society have studied and addressed over many decades, in numerous contexts.  
More challenging is how to address the deeper, longer-term uncertainties in bringing 
competition to electricity markets. These uncertainties come not from the similarities of 
electricity to earlier deregulated services, but from its differences. As noted in our introduction, 
electricity is unique because of the confluence of three characteristics: 
•  Crucial role in the economy. Electricity is important not merely because the United 
States spends about 3% of its gross domestic product on power. A better measure of 
its importance may be to imagine how the rest of the economy and society at large 
depend on it. To take but one example, the defining adjective of the growth of the 
Internet as a business and communications tool is not “silicon” or “digital” or 
“software,” but “electronic,” as in “electronic commerce.”  
•  Technically exacting. Many industries are crucial to the nation’s welfare. A short list 
includes food, health care, housing, telecommunications, and transportation. But 
keeping supplies and demands in constantly perfect balance is not a pressing concern 
in most of these industries. Excessive production may lead to some waste and costs in 
maintaining inventories. Too little production can lead to inconvenience—waiting for 
the next train, going to another grocer, getting a busy signal—and in some cases 
consumers can store a product to cushion the effects of any future shortages. But 
imbalances in most industries are more a nuisance than a potential catastrophe.  
•  Interrelatedness. If electricity were “only” critical and technically exacting, it would 
not present a potential crisis. If a supplier could not do a good job matching its 
supplies with its loads, it would be less able to attract future customers. The supplier 
could also offer warranties to insure its customers against losses resulting from power 
failures. Consumers could then choose among power suppliers on the basis of their 
reputations for reliability and warranties in case of outages. However, because 
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failure for all. Consequently, consumers cannot protect themselves by picking the 
right supplier, and suppliers cannot ensure reliability merely by guaranteeing that they 
can cover demands from their own customers.  
Those three factors—being crucial, technically exacting, and interrelated—combine to 
distinguish electricity from other commodities. Together, they will make reliability of the power 
system a continuing matter of public policy, even after we determine how best to deal with 
market power, air pollution, and other potential failures of electricity markets. 
Consequently, some degree of coordination— through explicit cooperation, regulatory 
and legal incentives, or centralized management—is necessary to ensure that one supplier’s 
imbalance does not bring down the entire system. Thanks in part to coordination among 
regulated monopoly utilities, power failures in the United States have almost always been local, 
as when lightning hits a utility pole or local substation. Wide-area failures, such as the New York 
City and Northeast blackout in 1965 or the western U.S. problems in 1996, are exceptional. Will 
this record continue as utilities compete in each other’s markets? If competing firms cooperate to 
manage reliability, can fixed prices, reduced output, and divided markets be far behind?  
We might promote reliability by using regulatory reserve requirements and liability 
penalties to hold individual generators responsible for system-wide losses incurred when they 
fail to meet the demands of their customers. Such rules may be ineffective if a generation 
company declares bankruptcy instead of covering losses due to breakdowns. The time it typically 
takes the legal system to resolve liability disputes could be inadequate for electricity, where 
supply and demand must be kept equal without interruption.  
If the need to ensure reliability requires central planning, the compatibility question 
becomes whether the role of that planner—a regional reliability council, RTO, ISO, distribution 
utility, or regulator of any or all of these entities—will leave sufficient scope for competition to 
be meaningful. If the central coordinator can limit its activity to relatively small and occasional 
purchases of ancillary services, the rest of the generation and marketing sectors will likely 
remain large enough to make competition worthwhile. On the other hand, operators of 
transmission systems and distribution grids have become involved in imposing reliability 
requirements and mandating the provision of ancillary services necessary to keep the grid 
operating. In some cases, this leads them to become involved in the management of markets 
themselves, sometimes proscribing the independent contracting between buyers and sellers that 
drives most other businesses. The more the planner has to extend its reach into managing Resources for the Future  Brennan, Palmer, and Martinez 
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transactions, purchasing electricity, and owning generation, the narrower the scope of 
competition.  
Whether we can reap the benefits of competition while retaining the coordination 
necessary to maintain system reliability remains the toughest test restructuring has to pass. Only 
experience can tell us whether there will be enough of a market left over to have been worth 
opening, after putting into place all the institutions, regulations, and procedures necessary to 
ensure reliability. 
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